Abstract
regarding responsibility. Despite traditional judicial deference towards states' assessments of emergencies, 4 this never extended to unquestioning 'trust'. In focusing on Resolution 1530, this article considers law's domain in the Security Council's political context, in particular, the hasty drafting and tabling of a resolution explicable only by reference to a rhetorical war on terror. It also considers the techniques of interpretation regarding so-called 'terrorism resolutions', the Security Council's role as inquisitor and arbiter of evidence and the assumption of good faith on the part of members. Finally, it considers the Security Council's future counterterrorist role and the issue of legitimacy, 5 so crucial to its credibility and effectiveness. Days after 3/11, initial indicators 6 all pointed towards Al-Qaida involvement, rather than domestic terrorism, yet Al-Qaida linkage remained 'obstinately downplayed '. 7 Foreign Minister Ana Palacio insisted that her country's diplomats confirm ETA's responsibility for the attacks, 8 but the Security Council delayed before attributing responsibility. Germany unsuccessfully attempted to insert 'allegedly' into Resolution 1530, concerned about setting a precedent usable for future score-settling. 27 Apparently a draft resolution omitting identification was verging on passage when Spain's delegation indicated its governmental instructions to include ETA's direct condemnation. 28 Spain's action illustrated the pre-eminence of a state's national interest above collective security interests in formulating a national position on a Security Council issue. 29 Departing from customary dilatoriness, the Security Council passed Resolution 1530 within hours of the attacks, with debate being non-existent. Generally, Security Council members' explicatory comments emerged off-the-record without any public 'justificatory discourse', 30 legal, political or evidential. The Secretary-General was, however, circumspect regarding the bombers' identity. 31 Resolution 1530 illustrated a reactive, negative aspect of the 'CNN effect' and a misunderstanding of 'crisis management ' . 32 Spain's certainty was embodied in its lightning-speed drafting and tabling of the resolution. 33 The Security Council's swift response reinforced the idea that Spain was urgently experiencing clear and present danger. 34 This seemed cruelly ironic when recalling Inocencio Arias' Council President's address in July 2003, maintaining that there were 'no shortcuts' in counter-terrorism and urging caution in responding to 'siren songs' demanding 'swift and drastic solutions'. 35 He would ultimately enter Spain's collective mea culpa.
36
After the vote, Deputy Permanent Representative of Spain, Ana María Menéndez thanked 'the international community' and Security Council members 'for their solidarity and their support', thus broadening out and transforming Spain's domestic concerns and objectives into global ones with identifiable outlaws. 37 The invocation of 'international community' encapsulated the 'war on terror' -acceptable because 27 Sciolino, supra note 8. In a contrasting tactic, US insistence upon condemning terrorist action by Hamas stonewalled a draft resolution (S/2004/240) The other principal statements specifically mentioning ETA came from two permanent Security Council members, Spain's prime erstwhile political allies, the US and UK.
41 Surprisingly, Javier Solana, the EU's top foreign policy official (and former Socialist Spanish foreign minister), also condemned ETA. As former NATO SecretaryGeneral and a terrorism expert, his statement carried particular weight. 42 A special edition of El Pais issued on 3/11 identified ETA, 43 although even as early as this an editorial suggested similarities to Al-Qaida. 44 The EU President simply referred to 'perpetrators of this appalling act of blind hate' 45 and the President of the European Council, was similarly reticent. 46 The Council of Europe expressed itself in silent tribute, 47 and King Juan Carlos urged simply '[u]nity, firmness and calm in the fight against terrorism, with all the instruments with which the rule of law provides us'.
48
In his afternoon address Prime Minister Aznar did not name ETA but clearly implied its identity. 49 The Spanish Interior Minister Ángel Acebes had accused ETA of 'seeking an attack with wide repercussions'. Within hours, he accepted that 'no possibilities have been discarded'. 50 Emotional shows of solidarity were held at the Basque 
Threats to the Peace
Davidsson considers good faith to be key to Security Council characterizations of threats. 62 This entails acting responsibly, with peace and security as the central focus, not permanent members' particular interests. Action should also be based on objectively verifiable facts, conduct or threats, not speculation, and it should avoid being inconsistent or applying double standards. Finally, measures should be proportionate to the immediacy and severity of the threat. 63 Ibid.
initiatives to reign in any possible interpretations authorizing action. Perhaps that caution was not clearly felt in the context of Resolution 1530, which envisaged no enforcement or self-defence. However, why was it thought appropriate to invoke Article 39 in a situation of domestic terrorism?
The Security Council had never characterized ETA attacks as threats to peace (not even those occurring post-9/11) so it is unclear clear why 3/11 posed one. Hundreds of terrorist incidents occurring annually remain unreferred to the Security Council. 70 While the Security Council has considered internal situations as threats to the peace (and obviously no arguments were raised in defence of Article 2(7) of the UN Charter 71 ), Spain was unlikely to dissolve into civil war.
72 Despite 3/11's magnitude, ETA's recent attacks and the discovery of serious amounts of ETA explosives in February 2004, it remains understood that it is the international character of acts which renders them an Article 39 threat.
73
Although Resolution 1269 could be read as being a general call against terrorism, preambular paragraphs 1, 3, 6, 8, and operative paragraph 5 all refer to 'international terrorism'. 74 Arguably 9/11 set in motion a new paradigm for states combating terrorism, but even Resolution 1368 in operative paragraph 1 condemned the 9/11 attacks, 'like any act of international terrorism' as a threat to international peace and security. 75 Perhaps with the increasing use of the stock phrase that it 'regards such acts, like any acts of terrorism as a threat to the peace', 76 the Security Council was drawing a parallel between the two types of terrorism. 77 Indeed, General Assembly resolutions regularly condemned 'all acts, methods and practices of terrorism wherever and by whomever committed, including those which jeopardize friendly relations among States and their security'. 78 However, the General Assembly was never the primary body regarding peace and security.
While concerned international terrorism. 80 Even Resolution 1440, concerning hostagetaking in a theatre by Chechen rebels in Russia, an internal war (perhaps surprisingly) referred to the traditional formulation. Similarly, Resolution 1455 condemning all terrorist acts reaffirmed that international terrorism constituted a threat. 81 Thus, between 9/11 and January 2003, the focus was on describing terrorism's international character or effects and was in line with the Security Council's increasingly thematic approach. Counter-terrorism's importance implicitly derived from terrorism's transnational threat to peace and security. 82 ETA was reputed to have members, supporters and training connections in South America, Europe and the Middle East 83 and to operate from French territory. French police arrested ETA suspects in the weeks post-3/11. Perhaps this bestowed an international dimension upon ETA's terrorism or perhaps 3/11 was so vehemently condemned due to an inherent European bias on the part of Security Council members linked by economics, culture (through colonial and cultural heritage) or geography. 84 Post-January 2003, a sea change appeared. Resolution 1465, condemned a Bogota nightclub's bombing by the internal Colombian rebel group FARC. '[T]hreats to international peace' were mentioned in the preamble. However, operative paragraph 1 stated that this act 'like any act of terrorism' represented a threat to peace and security. Resolutions became bolder in their drafting -all acts of terrorism were general threats to the peace. Resolution 1516 similarly condemned attacks in Istanbul and Resolution 1530 followed this formula. In fairness, Article 39 refers to a 'threat to the peace' with references to restoring international peace and security occurring in Articles 41 and 42. It is true that '[I]nternational bombing is among the "easy cases" in the sense that a "threat to international peace" is self-evident'. 85 Nevertheless, if it is accepted that all forms of terrorism threaten peace and security, 86 that all states have an erga omnes obligation to prevent and suppress any act of terrorism and that every 'State and competent international organization has a legal interest in ensuring compliance with this obligation ', 87 then Resolution 1530 appears to be in line with international legal trends.
But The Spanish government's gain in political terms from Resolution 1530 was potentially enormous (Aznar was tough on ETA), but what was Spain's legal advantage? By seeing Article 39's definition of threat less as an instrument towards future action, a growing autonomy for the notion of 'threat' itself emerges and does so with a currency of its own. Spain never sought authorization for sanctions or military enforcement. Even if it sought blue-ribbon approval for potentially repressive domestic legislation pursuing counter-terrorist ends, it did not require authorization for its passage. However, Spain's political alliance pursued and detained 'enemy combatants' seeking to guard the 'international community's' very existence. 93 Not a conventional armed conflict, 94 the 'war on terror' was thus a rhetorical war, with potentially more powerful and wide-ranging effects because of its profound way of impacting upon realities. Thus, winning the rhetorical war, even at the expense of denying an existing reality, was acceptable and possible because that rhetoric had the power to switch and change existing realities. 95 The latent non-legitimacy of Resolution 1530 could thus be converted. Hurd's point about the Security Council's symbolic value 96 becomes apparent. Official acknowledgement of Spain's imperilment imbued Spanish domestic counter-terrorism measures, both existing and potential, with international legitimacy. It indicated a reversal of the traditional resistance of strong states to Security Council involvement in domestic terrorism. The British specifically avoided war analogies regarding Northern Ireland (by a policy of noninternationalization of the conflict and via the use of UN procedural devices 97 ), except occasionally to justify harsh measures. 98 New Spanish legal measures 99 were unnecessary, but obtaining their international accreditation must have been irresistible. The highly critical report of UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, regarding Spain's treatment of ETA suspects, 100 issued only one month before 3/11, and to which Spain had reacted badly, 101 heightened the urgency of conferring/reinstating legitimacy upon its counter-terrorism initiatives. Resolution 1530 provided Spain with a powerful legal weapon in its artillery in the rhetorical war.
Evidential Issues
Wellens notes that when assessing the evidence demanded prior to the passing of a resolution, theoretically, a law enforcement solution creates a high threshold for adducing evidence;
102 if, however, the motivation is to maintain peace where the threat is obvious,
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'Once more our prime minister fishes out his favourite word: evil . . . we can expect heavy use of war, . . . and an attempt to collate all terrorist outrages into one "global threat"'. This was criticized as 'empty . . . theological jargon' ill-befitting 'the complex, profound experience' endured post mass carnage: Letters, Mather, 'A blast of harsh reality', Guardian, 106 Any sense of the Security Council being in thrall to a time-pressed crisis was exploited by the Spanish delegation. The fear of fatal chaos welcomed the decisiveness of a hegemony, even if that hegemonic ideal in fact undermined an international organization which provided structure, process and participation. 107 Perhaps the Security Council was seduced by the allure of strong decision-making 108 -there was a palpable sense of Spain urging the Security Council to display 'a combination of guts and brains'. 109 Regardless of any prevailing rhetoric of being 'with us or against us', 110 the Security Council's members were duty-bound to critically interrogate the authenticity of the need for urgency. Without signifying softness on terrorism, the validity of the Security Council's legal order would have remained unquestioned.
111
It was dubious that Spain even satisfied a 'preponderance of evidence' standard. A direct comparison cannot be made between evidence in the Security Council's political context and its use in the ICJ's judicial context -political choices will not be 103 entirely juridified. 112 However, this does not mean that an exercise of political authority needs no evidential authority. Further, 'axis of evil' rhetoric reduces certain states to second-class status politically and legally (by excluding them from law-making processes). Equally, 'war on terror' rhetoric potentially invokes a lower threshold standard for any measures taken in the offensive. 113 Legal argumentation can render issues elliptical, 114 but a basic legal technique of collecting and presenting supporting evidence is the basis of the actori incumbit probatio principle. To disrespect such rules means that 'the whole game is broken off, for everyone'. 115 Concretized rules regarding the production of evidence may not exist, but an evaluation exercise of evidence supporting these opposable positions is required, particularly given the absence of judicial review and the fact that a resolution on a legal issue indicates members' support for the legal claim embodied therein. 116 Resolutions provide evidence in themselves when a legal landscape is being surveyed 117 and changing expectations of states are being evaluated. 118 Absence of warnings pre-3/11 and the scale of the attack 119 indicated a sudden departure in ETA's modus operandi, 120 and it quickly denied involvement 121 -this in itself would be unique for a terrorist organization, which is proud of its armed struggle resulting in death, to lie about involvement. Thus, a commonplace, rather than reasonable, suspicion was operating. If international scrutiny and investigation is considered crucial prior to self-defence being undertaken by a state when it operates outwith Security Council authorization, 122 it seems perverse not to demand the same rigour of a resolution impliedly invoking the UN Charter. It was also unclear whether revealing to international scrutiny the information leading to ETA's blame would have raised a major security risk. Evidence of attribution rather than operational detail was needed and could have been disclosed by Spain. 123 Finally, merely because Resolution 1530 related to a threat rather than an act of aggression or a breach of the peace, as some lesser form of Charter breach, 124 should not eliminate some burden of proof. 125 Indeed, the evidence threshold may be more easily overcome for a state in the case of an obvious breach or aggression.
On 15 March, the day after Spain's election and Aznar's defeat, Inocencio Arias wrote to Security Council members saying that at the time the resolution was adopted, his government was 'firmly convinced' of ETA's responsibility. 126 Ana Palacio similarly maintained that Spain's belief in ETA's culpability was honest. 127 Particulars of evidence are unmentioned. 128 Insistences on honesty and good faith (a rather general constraint 129 ) reinforced Spain's acting on sovereign instinct or government impulse. Subsequent official Spanish explanations did little to convince 130 or mollify Security Council members. 131 The UN Secretary-General was clear that there was 'a lesson here for everybody, including the Council members'. 132 The Security Council's approach was exemplified by a senior French official reported as saying: 'Under the circumstances, nobody wanted to say no. ' 133 Yet asking for this evidence was the Security Council's right, and arguably its obligation. One year earlier the Security Council had witnessed a titanic struggle over evidence that Iraq was breaching its obligations in relation to weapons inspections. 134 Solid evidence is an indispensable requirement for legitimacy. 135 If it is crucial that international organizations are not perceived as being enslaved to the imperatives of a particular hegemony, then they must pause before undertaking emotionally intoxicated action. Resolution 1530's unanimous vote was principally an expression of the Security Council's sympathy, but is that really its role? Resolution 1530's passage reinforces Koskenniemi's recent accusation that international law is burdened by a sense of kitsch and that we congratulate ourselves on our capacity for being moved (and being seen to be moved) upon witnessing hardship. 136 It is 'the dictatorship of the heart' which renders something kitsch, telling easy truths and simple certainties. 137 Koskenniemi has been criticized for offering no criteria for distinguishing between a sincere and a cynical appeal to international morality. 138 Perhaps insistence on evidence would assist.
In response to 9/11, the Security Council has been described as taking 'a lead role . . . quick, firm and unequivocal. . . . a necessary and prudent exercise of [its] power and prerogative. . .'. 139 Although opinions differ on the possibility of judicial review, 140 examples such as Resolution 1530 and an apparently unfettered and inexplicable exercise of Chapter VII do little to justify the Security Council's current broad and independent power. Why did the Security Council become unnecessarily complicit in harming the UN's reputation? Arguably, the UN's structural rot was glimpsed. 141 Thus, perhaps criticizing the Security Council over Resolution 1530 misses the point because there is no longer any perception of independence about the Security Council's power. It is this independence, or perception thereof, which is indispensable.
Despite having little fact-finding capacity itself, paradoxically, the Security Council creates binding obligations for UN members. It has been concerned about its access to information from other UN bodies 142 and traditionally has been self-consciously cautious, pursuing a rigorously interrogative process. Consequently, the proposal of an independent, standing fact-finding commission is one of the more interesting innovations suggested for the Security Council, 143 representing development on the work of ad hoc bodies like those in Iraq and Yugoslavia 144 and the UN International Independent Investigation Commission charged with investigating the Rafic Hariri assassination. 145 A permanent body could begin to develop a distinguished reputation for serving the Security Council, cooperating with the 1373 Committee and thus diminishing the compartmentalization of the Security Council's work (in particular the work of the various delegated committees 146 ) which has been the focus of criticism.
147
A standing body would avoid constant infrastructural re-invention and repetitive start-up expenses. 148 Arguably such a permanent body would not have helped in the Resolution 1530 scenario because its focus is likely to envisage enforcement measures. Nevertheless, Security Council fact-finding involvement was identified as pertinent in initiating on-site investigations to identify states harbouring or supporting terrorist networks or facilities. 149 Undoubtedly, it may run into the same difficulties which beset UNMOVIC and one body might be insufficiently multi-faceted for use in widely varying scenarios. Additionally, the institutional motivation towards this new body may be explained by a desire to deflect attention away from the real problem of respect in state action for Security Council processes and procedures. However, discussions on reconfiguring and redirecting Security Council expertise is heartening, indicating an awareness of responsibility and an acceptance that Security Council power is not unquestioned or preserved in amber.
The Turn to (Un)ethics
The passing of Resolution 1530 echoed the 'turn to ethics' -the pursuit of goals ascertained by invoking the received wisdom of foreign office officials and government leaders. 150 It is a semi-theocratic characterization and Resolution 1530's passage did nothing to dispel a conclave atmosphere. Spain (perceived as expert) convinced because it 'just knew' ETA was involved. 151 If self-interest must at least coincide with common good for action to be considered legitimate 152 or ethical then Aznar's electoral imperative divested the action of such privilege. Spain had not sought Security Council condemnation of ETA outrages, despite the 'war on terror' and despite terrorism long having been on the Security Council's 153 and Spain's agenda. 154 Only in March 2004 did Spain put the issue of ETA terrorism before the Security Council, implicitly allying 3/11 and Resolution 1530 to 9/11 and Resolution 1368, and Madrid to New York. 155 Invoking Resolution 1368 to say 'We are all Spaniards', 156 just as surely as we were all Americans 157 on 9/11, illustrated strategic and cynical manipulation of Resolution 1368. It also highlighted the 'social magic' of a resolution and its capacity to make a difference in international politics. 158 Resolution 1530 further exemplified a misplaced reliance on the wisdom of power-brokers in Madrid: '[t]o credit the decision-makers as having been involved in an emotional process about their moral obligations is to make precisely that mistake of fact (of being in a position of power) for right'. 159 Perhaps terrorism's (albeit Al Qaida-style international terrorism) presence on the Security Council's agenda made the calls for condemnation irresistible, yet Resolution 1530 rendered the Security Council incapable of condemning an actual international terrorist incident. There is a marked irony here as international terrorism is deplored by the UN and represents a genuine threat to peace.
Could Spain's behaviour at the Security Council on 3/11 have been considered legitimate if it was correct? If based on solid evidence then there might be a case for legitimacy, although bulldozing the Security Council is never comfortable. In the case of serendipity, popular memory would simply recall Spain's accurate assessment, and legitimacy, however theoretically unmerited, would be accorded. Legitimacy seems partially defined by how events actually develop. There may be a geographical divide. The US public focuses on achievement of objectives, European practitioners and scholars are more drawn to process-derived legitimacy. 160 In this writer's view, if Spain had adduced credible evidence regarding ETA's culpability, it would ultimately have been considered honestly mistaken rather than manipulative.
161

Longer-term Problems for the UN and the Security Council
The failure to adequately deal with the Rwandan genocide, 162 the increasingly ad hoc nature of responses in use of force, the imbroglio witnessed in relation to Srebrenica's 'safe' havens, the oil-for-food scandal, the failure to deal adequately with peacekeepers accused of sexual violence, 163 and indeed Resolution 1530, have all conspired to emphasize and exaggerate the dissipated legitimacy of the Organization. Chesterman cautions about a reversion towards pre-Charter trends where the Security Council would exist only to advise Member States rendering international decisions once again contingent on the will of the powerful. 164 Murky Security Council politics doubtlessly embody the dark side of the international institutional personality -the Security Council's manipulation for the dirty work of states. 165 Nearly 20 years ago, Allott noted that despite a dramatic rise in the energy of public life within international society, with a corresponding intensification of activity and power on the part of specialists and professionals, there was no corresponding increase in democratic accountability. 166 Diplomacy remained a relatively closed world, esoteric and remote, animated by a bureaucratic spirit seeking the quiet life rather than the good life, without attempting to make original and energetic contributions to the general interest of society. 167 If both the Security Council and UN are perceived (mostly wrongly) as being apologists for hegemonic states or policies, this potentially compromises UN field personnel's safety. 168 'Bluewashing' no longer guarantees protection. Making oneself a target by flying the UN flag could partly be due to the delegitimization of the UN. 169 The attack upon the UN Headquarters in Iraq in August 2003 was not perpetrated randomly or because the locus was viewed as neutral. Indeed, the passing of Resolution 1483 (the so-called 'occupation resolution') may have done little to diminish the perception of UN bias, despite its refusal to authorize the intervention. If, after this resistance, the UN could still be viewed as partisan, then perceptions post-Resolution 1530 are shudder-inducing.
The intertwining of legitimacy, effectiveness and, consequently, credibility is invaluable. Therefore, if legitimacy is the elusive blue ribbon of approval, 'illegitimacy' is a death knell for any decision-making body's credibility and the enforcement of its declarations. It denotes President Bush's criticism of irrelevancy, suggested in his speech to the UN in September 2003. 170 Indeed, Richard Perle, in a coruscating essay of 172 It is true that the Security Council is caught on the horns of a dilemma -inactivity leads to accusations of irrelevancy while engagement is accompanied by accusations of self-interest of particular states. 173 The Security Council should perhaps become more proactive, but under-committed states hamper UN achievements. 174 The sense that Security Council decisions have the benefit of legitimacy invest them with potency. It is almost certainly true that legality is the indispensable foundation of legitimacy 175 and, taken together, enhance effectiveness. As Kagan notes, although an intangible factor in foreign policy (and unpopular with lawyers 176 ), legitimacy potentially has great practical significance. 177 Indeed, Koskenniemi was clear that law's place in collective security as a working culture was as a 'gentle civilizer', 178 and presumably legitimizer, of discussions around security. This necessitates acceptance of a supranational body's standing and authority, something traditionally difficult for the US, potentially more so, in a unipolar world. 179 Multilateral decision-making becomes the key to legitimacy and consequently states need the Security Council. Spain schizophrenically promoted its partial view via international endorsement for it. Allegedly, Washington toyed with the idea of claiming legitimacy for the 2003 Iraqi intervention if it could get nine affirmative votes on a failed resolution authorizing intervention. 180 Alternatively, arguably Washington sidestepped the Security Council, because rejection of its resolution would have made apparent its illegality and, by implication, its illegitimacy. 181 Either way, evidence of the Security Council's symbolic power to confer/withhold legitimacy is apparent.
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. . . although the Security Council did not deter war, it provided a clear and principled standard with which to assess the decision to go to war. The flood of Foreign Ministers into the Security Council chambers during the debates, and widespread public attention, suggest that the United States decision to bring the question of force to the Security Council reaffirmed not just the relevance but the centrality of the Charter of the United Nations. 183 Franck's definition of legitimacy of an institution's capacity to exert a pull towards compliance seems particularly pertinent. 184 Indeed, as the anti-war protests clearly indicated, large sections of the public identified themselves as actors equipped to judge the legality and thus the legitimacy of certain actions because they believed in the UN and its Security Council.
The process of delegitimizing the Security Council is well underway and it must be guarded against. Confidence in the Security Council may be diminished due to perceptions regarding the quality, objectivity and consistency of its decision-making, which is 'less than fully responsive to very real State and human security needs'. 185 At the same time, states and their peoples have a vested interest in maintaining decisionmaking in (a more transparent) Security Council because otherwise decision-making would be likely to migrate to even less democratic fora -destroying the Security Council is easier than replacing it. 186 It is true that the Security Council system is not properly Austinian in that states relinquishing power to it can presumably re-take it (e.g., by leaving the UN) but then, whither goest thou? A return to pre-1648, pre-1815, pre-1918 or pre-1939 times? Although it struggles against appearing like a figleaf for particular states' hegemonic interests, the UN still enjoys unique normative strength, global reach and convening powers, 187 no doubt principally by not being a state. The ascent of terrorism onto the Security Council's agenda has huge symbolic power for that issue. Those involved in it are 'players' and the fact that states fight for this territory emphasizes the Security Council's importance. 188 The Security Council's accountability and performance are questioned, but these criticisms are largely due to its lack of transparency and image of 'clubbiness', contributed to by its procedures and membership.
The Future for Security Council Decision-making
The global phenomenon of terrorism points to the increasing need for, and relevance of, international law responses to terrorism; scrupulous respect for the rule of law, good governance and accountability at the national as well as the international level are absolute requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security and for effectively preventing and suppressing terrorism. 189 It goes without saying that any hegemony, of a state or an idea like the 'war on terror', flies in the face of equality under the law. 190 It is supremely ironic that Security Council reform lost impetus when attention was diverted to the war on terror. 191 Further, if the legitimacy of the legal process itself is questioned, a key component of the rule of law is jeopardized 192 and the UN's focus on the rule of law should be simultaneously directed towards both its existence in states and in itself. 193 Legitimacy demands that a decision be both substantively legal and procedurally correct. It is not known whether Spain invoked principled legal arguments in support of its draft Resolution 1530, but its cross-reference to Resolution 1373 spoke volumes. 194 The irony was that rather than the recourse to legality serving to bookend 195 options for action, it opened them out saying something about the open-textured nature of Resolution 1373. Nevertheless, with a flexible interpretation of Article 39, Resolution 1530 can be judged to be substantively legal. It was, however, only procedurally legal because the procedures were so flexible, rendering procedural legality an empty vessel and divesting the resulting decision of fairness, authority and legitimacy. 196 'Diplomacy by posse' is not remotely desirable, 197 but if the UN is side-stepping the rule of law, its measures are no more attractive than are unilateral options -a particularly vulnerable Achilles heel. Equally, a myth of collectivity 198 to obscure the fundamentally unilateral nature of a Security Council members' action, a legitimacy veneer, is no more appealing. Lack of transparency (particularly evident in secret meetings) has long been a criticism of Security Council procedure, 199 as borne out in its discretion as to disposal. 200 Glennon's comment in relation to the aborted resolution of 24 February 2003 seems apt in the light of Resolution 1530, 'Eighty-five years after Wilson's housing a reliquary cabal. 226 Of course government officials engaged in counterterrorism generally make the best decisions they can within tight time-frames, and they do so in good faith. However, the Security Council is a crucial counter-terrorist body and must not be sidetracked or marginalized in this endeavour 227 -'those free of those pressures, and independent of government, should reflect on the issues with all the care and seriousness that the issues demand'. 228 
